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The Arab Oil Embargo and United
States Pressure Against Chile:
Economic and Political Coercion and
the Charter of the United Nations
Hartmut Brosche
INTRODUCTION
A CONOMIC WARFARE is a game that all can play. Many
I states have played this game, especially since 1945. In that
year Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations established
the general prohibition of the threat or use of force, a provision
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U.S. and other states with needed
which Waldock called "the
corner stone of peace in the
Charter."1  Since then new
problems have arisen and the
world situation has changed.
Richard N. Gardner 2 dealt
with this changing world situ-
ation and noticed these facts of
life when he proposed to deny
U.S. exports and aid to coun-
tries which refuse to supply the
raw materials.' His speech given
on November 14, 1973 before 2,000 business leaders at the 60th
National Foreign Trade Convention stimulated many U.S. Senators
to ask for major changes in President Nixon's trade legislation.
In his statement Professor Gardner proposed that the pending
trade bill be "revised from top to bottom" to take account of the re-
cent developments in international relations such as the use of eco-
nomic and political pressure. With special emphasis on the Arab oil
embargo, he asked that the President be authorized to deny United
1 Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force hy Individual States in International
Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 451 (1952).
2 Currently Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Pro-
fessor Gardner has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Af-
fairs in the Kennedy Administration and was a member of President Nixon's Commis-
sion on International Trade and Investment Policy.
3 Columbia Law Alumni Observer, Dec., 1973, at 12.
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States exports and aid to countries that deny the United States and
others needed raw materials.
These suggestions evoked a lively response from several Sena-
tors, who, as members of the Senate Finance Committee, asked Pro-
fessor Gardner to prepare language which could be incorporated in-
to the bill.
Professor Gardner replied that he was not proposing "at this
time" that the United States retaliate against the Arab oil-producing
countries because there was still a chance that the Middle East set-
tlement might be achieved through quiet diplomacy. However, he
said that the U.S. negotiating position would be strengthened "by
some carefully drawn amendments to the trade bill that put the oil-
producing nations and others on notice that they cannot wage eco-
nomic war upon us with impunity." He noted that, although the
United States and its partners in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) depended on Arab oil, the
Arabs also depended on the United States and its partners for food,
medicines, industrial machinery, and consumer goods.
"The Soviet bloc is not in a position to fill the gap completely if
the OECD countries cut off supplies," he asserted. "In any event,
countries like Saudi Arabia would think twice about becoming com-
pletely dependent on Communist countries."
Citing the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, which resulted in the
Atlantic Charter, as an example, Professor Gardner recalled that in
1941 the postwar goal was proclaimed to be, access, on equal terms,
to the trade and the raw materials of the world.
In the first postwar decades, when the preoccupation was with un-
employment and surplus production, international trade negotiations
focused almost entirely on access to markets and virtually ignored
the problem of access to supplies. Now, however, we are moving
into an era of resource scarcity and accelerated inflation - an era
in which producing countries are increasingly tempted to withhold
supplies for economic and political reasons.
Since the U.N. Charter, countries are no longer permitted to use
force to back up their economic claims. Quite apart from legal pro-
hibition, such actions now entail costs and risks that make them
politically undesirable. But if the Atlantic Charter concept of equal
access to raw materials cannot be guaranteed by the use of force,
we need to consider guaranteeing it in some other way.
I have no easy solution to this problem, 'but I do suggest that we
bend every effort to write some new rules of international law pro-
viding for equal access to raw materials into the GATT and into
other international agreements and that we develop some multilat-
eral sanctions against countries that violate these rules, whether
they are parties to the agreements or not. If we can propose cutting
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off air services to countries that give refuge to hijackers, if we can
contemplate denying port facilities to nations that pollute the oceans
with their tankers, we should certainly explore the possibility of
multilateral trade and aid embargoes on nations that withhold vital
raw materials for political purposes.3a
This speech proposes methods of responding to economic war
and political pressure and methods for utilizing the economic po-
tential of one country in conjunction with international economic
relations as countermeasures for dealing with this type of coercion.
It is astonishing that Professor Gardner draws his attention to the
Atlantic Charter and even to the GATT, but mentions the Charter
of the United Nations only when he refers to the prohibition of the
use of force to back up the economic claims of one country. No con-
sideration is given to the questions concerning the extent that eco-
nomic and political pressure may be used in international relations,
whether these kinds of coercion are in accordance with international
law and whether blockades, embargoes and boycotts are consistent
with what the U.N. Charter prescribes.
The purpose of this article will be to examine whether economic
and political pressure may be used in international relations without
violating the Charter of the United Nations. Focusing on this docu-
ment is necessary in order not to expand the arguments ad infinitum.
No attempt is made here to deal with all aspects and implications of
international law related to this matter. Emphasis will be laid on
the general prohibition of the use or threat of force as formulated in
Article 2(4) of the Charter and further consideration will be given
to related provisions which might be of relevance in this connection.
Before turning to the questions of law, it is useful to recount the
facts of the two recent situations where economic pressure was used
to achieve political goals and which played a predominating role in
international relations, the Arab oil embargo and the financial and
economic pressure exerted by the United States against Chile before
the overthrow of Allende.
Both situations differ in various aspects. In the first case it was
the developing countries which imposed the embargo with the de-
veloped states, especially the United States having to suffer. In the
second case it was just the opposite; the United States playing the
active role and a country from the third world, Chile, being the af-
fected state. The oil embargo was imposed by a large group of
states with common political interests and many nations felt the re-
percussions; while in Chile's case only two states were involved. The
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Arab countries used pressure directed against other governments;
the United States coerced Chile mainly through international orga-
nizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank. Other differences will be obvious by an examination
of the facts.
In both cases political considerations led to the use of economic
pressure, and the states which played the game of economic warfare,
by and large, achieved their goals.
THE FACTS: Two RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF
ECONOMIC COERCION
The Arab Oil Embargo
The Arab oil embargo was one of the most successful weapons
introduced into world politics during the last years. One of the
main reasons for its success is the fact that oil reserves are not evenly
distributed among nations.' More than 63 percent of known world
petroleum reserves are located within the territory of states belong-
ing to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),'
seven of whose 11 full members are Arab states. Thus, most of these
reserves can be found in the Persian Gulf area. The rest is owned
primarily by the United States (about six per cent), and the Socialist
countries (about 15 per cent).6
A similar imbalance exists in oil consumption. On the demand
side the United States is the country with the greatest need. With
only six percent of the world population, it consumes almost one-
third of the world's oil production. Two-thirds of this demand is
supplied from domestic resources, the rest being imported.7  Other
major energy-consuming countries of the industrial world are even
more dependent upon oil imports. For example, the European Com-
munity imports 90 percent of its needs and Japan virtually all.
Countries which for the present are self-sufficient in their energy re-
4 For further elucidation, see Amuzegar, The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play,
51 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 676 (1973) and KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 26224
(Nov. 6-Dec. 2, 1973).
5 The OPEC (headquarters in Vienna) was founded in 1960 in Baghdad. Members
are: Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela and Ecuador. Its function is to coordinate oil policies of member
states. For details of OPEC's history, see KEESING'S ARCHIV DER GEGENWART, Nov.
15, 1973, at 18319.
6 OIL & GAS J., Dec. 25, 1972, at 82.
7 It now produces about 11 million barrels of oil a day and consumes nearly 17 mil-
lion barrels a day. By 1985 or even sooner, the U.S. need for oil imports is estimated to
reach nearly 15 million barrels a day or more than 50 per cent of consumption.
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quirements, like the Soviet Union and China, are likely to become
oil importers by the end of this century. Thus, the future imbalance
between supply and demand of oil is indeed significant. Coun-
tries which exploit this critical situation unscrupulously for political
purposes in international relations have a dangerous weapon at
hand and are able to put world economics into total disorder. The
Arab oil embargo has illustrated this point since 1967 when oil was
first brought into play as a weapon for achieving political aims.8
In the 1967 Six-Day War, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich countries
placed a total embargo on oil shipments to the United States and
Great Britain.
In 1967, it furthermore must be remembered that, Saudi Arabia
cut the flow of oil involuntarily - under pressure by Nasser - and
therefore did not enforce the measure strictly. The boycott was
lifted through the efforts of Saudi Arabia after one month and its
effects never became bothersome. Indeed, Saudi Arabia had repeat-
edly objected to proposals by Nasser and Arab radicals to use oil as
an instrument in the service of the Arab cause. King Faisal, in par-
ticular, insisted that oil and politics should not be mixed. He pro-
claimed that the Arabs should not and that he himself would not
allow oil to be used as a political weapon.
This situation has changed, however, but it is difficult to ascer-
tain why. From the economic viewpoint, it is arguable that in the
past, Saudi Arabia was dependent on all the revenues earned from
oil for its own needs. Thus the oil weapon was of limited use and
could hurt the state which was attempting to use it. Today the in-
crease in oil revenues, far beyond current needs, makes it possible
for oil producers to be more flexible in using this weapon, without
having to fear retaliation by those countries affected. On the politi-
cal side it is surely important that after Nasser's death and the failure
of a comparable personality to emerge in the Arab world, King
Faisal need not comply with anyone's pressures and can retain con-
trol of the weapon himself.
Not only has King Faisal's reluctance disappeared, in 1972 other
Arab leaders in influential positions made no less than 15 different
threats to use oil as a weapon against their political adversaries, in
particular singling out the United States.' The common response
from the American side has been: "They need us as much as we
8 For further information, see Akins, The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here, 51
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 462 (1973), and Safran, The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 215, 219-22 (1974).
9 See Akins, supra note 8, at 467.
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need them;" "they can't drink the oil;" or "boycotts never work."'"
They seemingly have not taken these threats seriously.
In the months preceding the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War
on October 6, 1973, increasing pressures built up within OPEC to
take a stronger line in dealings with the major international oil
companies, which are principally U.S.-based. In addition, Libya na-
tionalized a majority interest in most of the remaining foreign oil
companies operating within her territory." These demands were
partly based on market conditions and taken in the light of the com-
bined effects of adjustments in currency parities and inflation in the
developed countries.' 2
A further major factor was the constantly growing hostility of
Arab nations towards the United States and to a lesser degree, to-
wards other Western countries which gave support to Israel in her
confrontation with countries of the Arab world.' 3  In May 1973 the
Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, called on Arab states to use their
oil to pressure the U.S. to drop its support of Israel.'4 Libya, Iraq,
Kuwait and Algeria temporarily halted the flow of oil to the West
on May 15 as a symbolic protest against the continued existence of
Israel as a state. On August 31 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia warned
the U.S. Government that it would be "extremely difficult" for his
country to maintain friendly relations with the United States and to
1Old.
11 Libyan action during 1973 is described in KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES
26194 (Nov. 12-18, 1973), especially as far as the companies Nelson Bunker Hunt, Oc-
cidental and Oasis, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Mobil, Exxon, and Shell are con-
cerned. In this respect it is interesting that Hon. Cunnar Lagergren, a Swedish app2als
judge appointed as arbitrator by the International Court of Justice in the dispute be-
tween Libya and British Petroleum, had ruled in October, 1973, that the nationalization
of the BP assets was illegal and confiscatory, in breach of BP's concession agreement, a
clear violation of international law, made for purely extraneous political reasons, and
arbitrary and discriminatory in character; he said BP was entitled to damages which
would be assessed later.
12 Only a limited inflationary element had been contained in the five-year agreement
signed in Tehran with the six Gulf states (Abu Dhabi, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia), although a revised system had been adopted in June 1973 for these states. Id.
at 26195.
3 In particular, anti-American feeling was intensified when the U.S. on July 26,
1973, vetoed a U.N. Security Council draft resolution which expressed "serious con-
cern" at Israel's lack of cooperation with U.N. Middle East peace efforts, "strongly de-
plored" Israel's continuing occupation of Arab territories, and reaffirmed Resolution
242 of 1967. The debate on the Middle East situation had begun on June 6 but had
been suspended from June 15 until July 20. The draft resolution received 13 affirmative
votes, with China abstaining, but the U.S. vote was cast against (the 5th U.S. veto since
the establishment of the U.N.), and the resolution was therefore defeated.
14 See FACTS ON FILE 391 (1973) ; Sadar said: "The case is one of protracted strug-
gle and not only on the Suez-Canal battle. There is the battle of America's interests, the
battle of energy and the battle of the Arabs."
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continue supplying oil because of the U.S. "complete support of
Zionism against the Arabs."1 5 On the other hand he cautioned the
Arab leaders against the use of oil as a political weapon in an inter-
view given the previous day. 6 On September 4 the oil ministers of
ten Arab states met in Kuwait to formulate a common policy on
using their oil resources as a diplomatic weapon against Israel. As
radical and conservative states posed sharply differing opinions, the
conference failed to reach an agreement on joint action.' 7 The time
for a complete embargo by all Arab countries had not yet come.
On October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur, the fourth Arab-Israeli war
broke out.18 The United States continued its support of Israel, re-
supplying her with weapons. As a countermeasure the Arab oil ex-
porting countries took concerted action to reduce supplies of oil to
Europe and Japan and to withhold supplies entirely from the United
States and the Netherlands." Almost overnight they made the
world aware of how their strong weapon could effectively be used
to achieve political goals and the consequences to be born by the
industrialized nations from the lack of oil supplies.
This time Saudi Arabia took the leading role in the Arab action
against the United States and other countries, notwithstanding its
hitherto more conservative policies and cordial relations with the
United States.
At a meeting of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC) in Kuwait on October 17, the ten member-
states2" decided to reduce production of petroleum by at least five
percent progressively each month, until Israeli forces had with-
drawn completely from territories occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War
"r Id. at 737; for further warnings see pp. 329, 780, 837.
I6KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 26194 (Nov. 12-18, 1973): "No one is
asking where, if we cut off the oil, we would get the money we need for supporting our
country and providing assistance to our brothers on the confrontation lines with Israel."
17 FACTS ON FILE 737 (1973).
18 For comments on this event, see Smart, The Super-Powcrs and the Middle East,
30 THE WORLD TODAY 4 (1974); Smart, Die Supermdichte und der Nahe Osten, 29
EUROPAARCHIV 9 (1974); Menning, Der vierte Nahost-Krieg in den Vereinten Natio-
nen, 21 VEREINTE NATIONEN 202 (1973); Hottinger, Der vierte arabisch-israelische
Krieg und seine politischen Folgen, 29 EUROPAARCHIV 83 (1974).
19 For details, see FACTS ON FILE 861 (1973) and KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY
ARCHIVES 26224 (Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1973); for related questions, see Mabro & Monroe,
Arab Wealth from Oil: Problems of its Investment, 50 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 15
(1974).
20 Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrein, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria; OAPEC (headquarters in Kuwait) was founded in 1968. Its function is to co-
ordinate the interests of its member-states and to cooperate in oil production. For details
'of OAPEC's history, see KEESING's ARCHIV DER GEGENWART 18319 (Nov. 15, 1973).
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and the legal rights of the Palestinians had been restored. In addi-
tion, a number of Arab countries imposed total embargoes on ship-
ments to the United States.2' Later in October similar total bans
were placed on shipments to the Netherlands. 2 2  Further cutbacks
were announced at meetings of Arab Oil Ministers held in Kuwait
on November 5 and in Vienna on November 18. At the latter
meeting it was decided to exempt from these cutbacks all members
of the European Community with the exception of the Netherlands
"in appreciation of the political stand taken by the Common Market
countries in their communique concerning the Middle East crisis.' '2
In addition, the Gulf states unilaterally announced on October 16 a
seventy percent increase in the posted price of crude oil, thereby
abandoning the price formula agreed to in Tehran in February
1971.24
It would go too far to describe all the effects caused by the
Arab action.25  The United States which suffered heavily from the
oil embargo warned the Arab states on November 21, 1973 through
Secretary of State Kissinger that the U.S. might have to consider
retaliatory action if the embargo continued "unreasonably and in-
definitely." He did not specify what kind of countermeasures the
U.S. might be prepared to take or whether any deadlines had been
set, but he said that "those countries who are engaging in economic
pressure against the U.S." should consider whether their continued
embargo was now appropriate while peace efforts were in progress.
Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani, directly responded to Kis-
singer's remarks: If the U.S. made any attempt to use military force,
Saudi Arabia would blow up its oil fields.26
21 This embargo involved directly some 6 percent of U.S. consumption, much of it
from the U.S.-owned Aramco operating in Saudi Arabia.
22 This latter ban had serious effects not only on the Netherlands, but also on various
other countries since much crude oil is refined in Rotterdam and re-exported in refined
form.
.23 Text: KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 28227 (Nov. 26, 1973).
24 For further price increases see Amuzeger, supra note 4, at 679.
25 For details, see KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 26226-28 (Nov. 26-Dec.
2, 1973).
26 FACTS ON FILE 983, 984 (1973); for further threats see 1001 (1973) and 1
(1974). During the summit meeting of Arab leaders in Algiers (Nov. 26-28), a resolu-
tion was passed which stated that the conference had decided "to continue the use of oil
as a weapon in the battle until the withdrawal from occupied Arab lands is realized and
the rights of the Palestinian People were assumed." This strategy would be carried out
as follows:
(a) By maintaining the oil embargo on all states supporting Israel;
(b) By maintaining cuts in petroleum production to a degree that would not
lead to reducing the income of the producing states by more than one quarter of
their 1972 income.
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These last remarks show clearly the escalation of the crisis, with
threats and counterthreats of embargoes, boycotts and other means
of political and economic pressure and demonstrate how serious and
difficult a situation existed. Thus enormous relief could be felt in
the international political arena when the oil producing countries
finally decided at the end of March 1974 to lift the embargo against
the United States, freeze posted prices and raise production levels.
Now the world is aware of how important, effective and dan-
gerous oil, as a political weapon in international relations, can be.
It should be kept in mind that this weapon can easily be used again
for political reasons and oil consumers would be well advised to
reach some agreement with the oil producing nations in order to
avoid a new outbreak of this kind of economic warfare.
THE U.S. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AGAINST
CHILE BEFORE THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE
When President Allende spoke before the General Assembly of
the United Nations on December 4, 1972, he stated that an "invis-
ible financial and economic blockade" was imposed on Chile by the
United States.2 1 Since the time he had been elected to office in Sep-
tember 1970, he said, his country had to suffer from heavy economic
and political pressure calculated to cut off his country from trading
with other states, to paralyze the export of its main revenue source,
copper, and to barricade the way to international finances, all with
the purpose of securing the overthrow of his government. He
referred to this "financial strangulation" as "yet another manifesta-
tion of imperialism, one that is more subtle, more cunning and ter-
rifyingly effective in preventing us from exercising our rights as a
sovereign state." He called it an indirect form of aggression, not
openly declared but taking place in a veiled form, hurting the econ-
omy of his country and undermining its sovereignty and dignity.
Such actions represented "the exertion of pressure on an economi-
cally weak country, the infliction of punishment on a whole nation
for its decision to recover its own basic resources, and a form of inter-
vention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state."
What were the facts which lead to such a strong accusation and
what incidents might justify such enormous criticism?
Shortly after the 1970 Chilean presidential elections, in which
27 For the text of Allende's speech ee 28 EUROPAARCHIV D86 (1973); excerpts are
given in FACTS ON FILE 980 (1972); and KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 25825
(Apr. 9-15, 1973).
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Allende was elected by only 36 per cent of the vote, the Chilean
Government started nationalizing American property in Chile.28 In
July 1971 an amendment to the Chilean Constitution, providing for
nationalization of the copper mines, was unanimously passed by both
houses of the legislature and signed by President Allende. Thus
the large copper mining industry became completely owned by the
Chilean State.2'9  The amendment provided for compensation as fol-
lows: the amount of compensation should be determined through
independent evaluation by the Controller General; but from that
evaluation the "excess profits" that nationalized companies had ob-
tained were to be deducted. 0 This deduction for excess profits was
a radical departure from past compensatory schemes and led to great
controversies between Chile and the United States. Moreover, after
the announcement of evaluation and excess profit figures it was clear
that the two major companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, would not
receive any compensation whatsoever, as their "excess profits" ex-
ceeded the evaluation of their assets.31
This nationalization of the copper mining industry 2 was not the
only measure taken against U.S. economic holdings in Chile. U.S.
interests were, inter alia, affected by a moratorium, declared in No-
vember 1971 on most of Chile's foreign debts.3"
These and other incidents resulted in U.S. countermeasures. In
January 1972, President Nixon issued a formal policy statement
which specified that the United States would not extend new bi-
lateral economic benefits and would oppose multilateral loans to
countries expropriating significant U.S. interests without taking "rea-
sonable steps" towards compensation.34 Shortly before this, ITT
28 Allende and his opponent candidate, Radomiro Tomic (who received 29 percent)
had both demanded immediate and total nationalization in their election campaigns; the
vote showed that Chile's population supported this movement. See N.Y. Times, Sept.
6, 1971.
29 Part of the ownership had already been taken over in 1967 and 1969 under Presi-
dent Frei.
30 See Law No. 17450 of July 16, 1971, in 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1067 (1971).
31 For details, see 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1235-40 (1971).
32 For further information, see Fleming, The Nationalization of Chile's Large Copper
Companies in Contemporary Interstate Relations, 18 VILL. L. REV. 593 (1973); Schies-
ser, Recent Developments in Latin American Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L LAWYER
64 (1972) and U.S. Dept. of State Report on Nationalization, Expropriation, and other
Taking of U.S. and Certain Foreign Property since 1960 in 11 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 84 (1972).
33 See Sigmund, The "Invisible Blockade" and the Overthrow of Allende, 52 FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS 322, 324 (1974).
34 Id.
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had submitted to the State Department proposals of how to put
Chile under pressure, including an embargo on Chilean exports to
the U.S., a veto on Chile's requests for loans in the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank, and advice to the
U.S. and international banking industry not to extend further credits
to Chile.35 Actually, U.S. banks had already changed their loan pol-
icies especially as far as short-term loans were concerned, and had
systematically begun suspending all sources which Chile. previously
had used to finance its imports. Within fourteen months credits
dropped from $220 million to $25 million. 6
Finally, the Congress of the United States passed in 1972 the
"Gonzales Amendment" which instructed U.S. representatives in
multilateral lending institutions and international finance organiza-
tions to vote against loans requested by countries expropriating U.S.
companies without compensation.3 7
This increased the existing tension in Chile's relations with the
United States. As Chile's inner economic situation worsened, those
who wanted to use coercive measures against the Allende Govern-
ment by cutting off Chile from international financial sources had an
excellent excuse by referring to Chile's "credit-worthiness." Thus
it becomes difficult to draw a line between legitimate reasons for
denial of loans and credits and those of a possibly illegal character,
like economic warfare to cause the economic breakdown of a coun-
try. A short survey of single measures taken by different institutions
might be helpful to illustrate this distinction.
The last loans approved to Chile during Allende's presidency by
the Inter-American Development Bank were two loans of January
1971, one of $7 million for the Catholic University in Santiago and
the other in the amount of $4.6 million for the Universidad Austral
in Valdivia. 8 Requests submitted by the Allende Government for
educational loans to the Catholic University of Valparaiso and the
Universidad del Norte were never taken into consideration by the
IDB board.
35 Id. at 331 with further references.
36 Figures are given by Mario Diaz in Punto Final (Santiago), June 20, 1972, at 16-
18. See also Jaime Faivovich, Punto Final, Sept. 26, 1972, at 2, and James F. Patras &
Robert La Porte, Chile: No, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer, 1972, at 132.
87 Sigmund, supra note 33, at 326.
381 d. at 327. According to the Senate ITT Hearings, $54 million from previously
approved loans had also been disbursed by the Bank; see Hearings on Multinational Cor-
porations and United States Foreign Policy Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Cor-
porations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 533
(1973).
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In this respect it is important to know that the United States
controlled forty percent of the votes on the board of the Bank and
thus was able to veto all requests, the approval of which required a
two-thirds majority, as in the case of educational loans. It may hard-
ly be doubted that the U.S. used its influence in order to make these
loans unavailable to Chile. 9
The World Bank's policy was similar. Several projects had been
under consideration. But when in early 1971 the Inter-American
Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) conducted its an-
nual country review, the representative of the World Bank stated
that Chile's economic situation was temporarily uncertain. This fac-
tor made the efficacy and rationality of further loans questionable.
Several pending loans were, as a consequence, not approved.40 In
addition, the issue of compensation for the nationalization of the
copper mines was taken into consideration. The Bank's demands
for reasonable progress in settling these disputes were rejected by
Chile. All these events resulted in the fact that the Allende Gov-
ernment did not receive any further loans from the World Bank,4'
and led to sharp controversies between Alfonzo Inostroza, president
of the Central Bank of Chile, and Robert McNamara, president of
the World Bank. Inostroza accused the Bank of acting "not as an in-
dependent multinational body at the service of the economic devel-
opment of all its members, but in fact as a spokesman and instru-
ment of private interests in one member country." 42 McNamara re-
plied that in similar instances concerning Bolivia, Guyana and Iraq
the Bank had approved loans to these countries despite compensa-
tion disputes, but that in the case of Chile "that question had not yet
arisen because the primary condition for Bank lending - a soundly
managed economy with clear potential for utilizing additional funds
efficiently has not been met.' '4a
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) took a completely dif-
ferent position; it did not care about compensation disputes or ques-
39 Sigmund, supra note 33, at 327. Sigmund mentions a report published in The
New York Times and other newspapers which stated that immediately after the coup
of September, 1973, the Bank approved $65 million of new loans; in his opinion this
statement is not true, as "it appears from Bank sources that the $65 million figure was
based only on tentative budget planning for 1974 ... 
40 Id. at 328 with further references.
41 This situation has recently changed; the World Bank is providing Chile with
$5.25 million to cover the foreign exchange costs of carrying out pre-investment studies;
see U.N. Press Release IB/3246, Feb. 8, 1974.
42 Sigmund, supra note 33, at 329.
43 Id.
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tions of credit worthiness. According to its function, assisting mem-
ber-countries with foreign exchange difficulties, it made available to
Chile loans to allow for adjustment in the drop in world copper
prices. The United States could not object to this lending policy
which was within the authority of the IMF.4"
In July 1971 negotiations between Chile and the Export-Import
Bank concerning a request for a $21 million loan for the purchase
of three passenger jets from Boeing for the Chilean national airline
were nearly completed. But the Bank refused to give its final ap-
proval for the credit and informed the ambassador of Chile that the
decision had been deferred until further information on the copper
compensation question would be available. At a press conference
held shortly thereafter the Chilean ambassador called this deferral
a "blatant attempt to pressure the Chilean government. ' 45
It is certain that the cited measures contributed to Chile's cata-
strophic financial and economic situation in 1972 and 1973. There
were hardly any substantial foreign exchange reserves left, the in-
flation rate climbed within a few months from 33 to 99.8 per cent,
46
and Chile was not able to pay its international debts. 4' But, the
United States' action had another effect in that Chile was enormous-
ly successful in obtaining loans from other countries48 and thus could
avoid a total collapse of its economy. Nevertheless the U.S. policy
can undoubtedly be regarded as a major contribution to the over-
throw of Allende even if other basic causes may admittedly be
sought elsewhere.49
Repercussions on Inter-state Relations
In describing the factual situation of the Arab oil embargo and
the financial and economic pressure exercised by the United States
against Chile before the overthrow of Allende it has been shown
what important role political and economic coercion can play in in-
ternational relations. It has to be kept in mind that similar in-
44 Sigmund gives further details. Id.
451d. at 330. Unofficial information was given by the State Department that this
decision had been made under influence from business interests "at the White House
level." N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1971, at 3, col. 2.
40 Sigmund, supra note 33, at 335.
47 For recent developments in Chile's economic situation, see KEESING'S CONTEM-
PORARY ARCHIVEs 26553 (April 1-7, 1974).
48 Detailed figures are given by Sigmund, supra note 33.
49 This point is emphasized by Sigmund, id. at 338-40. See also Whitehead, Why
Allende Fell, 29 THE WORLD TODAY 461 (1973).
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stances occur daily. Most of them are not of such an outstanding
character as the examples just given.5" But almost always it is for
the achievement of political goals that this kind of pressure is used.
There are probably very few situations, if any, which do not have
repercussions on inter-state relations; even disputes of a minor char-
acter are sometimes likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. The second part of this article will there-
fore deal with the question as to the extent economic and political
pressure may be used in international relations without violating the
U.N. Charter and whether or not there are any means of eliminat-
ing this kind of coercion from the list of international disputes en-
dangering world peace and security.
THE LAW: CONSISTENCY WITH THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS?
The General Prohibition of the Use of Force in Art. 2(4)
of the Charter
Historical Background
The idea that the use or threat of force is contrary to interna-
tional law is relatively new; traditionally, international law prior to
1919 did not limit any kind of force, pressure or coercion in inter-
state relations. Recourse to war was permitted not only for enforc-
ing rights recognized by international law, but also for challenging
and destroying the existing legal rights of other states.51 If war in
general was permitted, it is beyond a doubt that there was no limi-
tation to minor kinds of "coercion" like political and economic pres-
sure.
These foundations of the traditional rule of international law
have been altered since the First World War. The result of this
development has been a limitation and, subsequently, a renunciation
and prohibition of war, and, more generally, of the use or threat of
force. As the first cornerstone in this development, the Covenant
of the League of Nations has to be examined. Although it did not
abolish the right of war, means of pacific settlement prescribed in
50 One most critical issue has been left aside in this paper, the situation between
the two German states - especially concerning West-Berlin. The political tension in this
area is a permanent source of economic and political pressure. See Bowett, Economic
Coercion and Reprisal by States, 13 VA. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1972). See also Note, Recog-
nition of the DDR: Some Legal Aspects of West Germany's Foreign Policy and the Quest
for German Reunification, infra at 94.
51 The historical development of the legal regulation of the use of force is illustrated
in detail in BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
1-122 (1963).
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Articles 10 to 15 had to be exhausted before states were allowed to
resort to it. Otherwise a war was unlawful and sanctions could be
applied against a state violating these prohibitions. The Covenant,
therefore, fundamentally changed the status of war in international
law and made any war between states a matter of international con-
cern. The next important step was taken in the General Treaty for
the Renunciation of War in 1928 (Pact of Paris or Kellogg-Briand
Pact) in which the parties solemnly declared that they condemned
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and
renounced it as an instrument of international policy in their rela-
tions with one another. In addition they agreed that the settlement
or solution of disputes should never be sought except by pacific
means. 2 As a result of this treaty war had ceased to be a legal rem-
edy or an instrument for changing the law. In the years that fol-
lowed numerous treatieg reaffirmed the Pact's obligations, as a re-
sult state practices were considerably affected.
The Charter of the United Nations, in force since October 24,
1945, finally provides a general prohibition of the threat or use of
force. Its basic provision relating to that matter, Article 2, paragraph
4 states:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purpose of the United Nations.
As a consequence the use or threat of force, other than in self-de-
fense or with the authority of an organ of the United Nations, is il-
legal.
The cumulative result of these international enactments of a
general character was to completely alter the legal position of war
and of the threat or use of force. Taking into account the univer-
sality of the Organization of the United Nations it may be said that
the wide-reaching prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article
2(4) of the Charter constitutes general international law. Referring
to the importance of these new principles, Brownlie stated: "The
Charter stands with the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the two instru-
ments though independent of each other form the essential juridi-
cal basis of the world legal order and of world peace. ''53
But does this general principle of the illegality of the threat or
use of force include economic and political pressure, or is it only
52 Arts. I and II of the Pact.
53 BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 113.
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military force which is prohibited? Since the foundation of the
United Nations this problem has been of major concern. Opinions
on this issue differ widely and numerous controversies have arisen
out of this question. Different aspects have been discussed at inter-
national conferences, during regional meetings of states, in judicial
decisions, and in writings of qualified publicists of various nations.
States of the Eastern Bloc and countries of the Third World have
been especially vocal in their repeated demands for the inclusion of
-non-military" forms of duress within the general prohibition of
force.5
4
The tremendous amount of literature already existing in this
field reflects the relevance of this question for international rela-
tions.55 In this article only a few major arguments can briefly be
discussed to elucidate whether the general prohibition of the threat
or use of force as laid down in Article 2 (4) of the Charter includes
economic and political pressure.
Interpretation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter
According to the interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 1969,56 a treaty shall be interpreted gram-
matically, systematically, logically and in light of its object and pur-
pose; supplementary means are the travaux preparatoires and the
practice of the United Nations.5 7
5 4 See WENGLER, DAS VOLKERRECHTLICHE GEWALTVERBOT, PROBLEME UND
TENDENZEN 10 (Berlin 1967).
55 A thorough examination of the existing literature is given in the monograph by
Rolf M. Derpa, Das Gewaltverbot der Satzung der Vereinte Nationen und die Anwen-
dung Nichtmilitirischer Gewalt, 1970 (Bad Homburg, W. Germany).
56 This convention is not yet in force, but the necessary number of 35 ratifications will
probably soon be reached; see H. BROSCHE, ZWANG BEIM ABSCHLUSS VOLKERRECHT-
LICHER VERTRAGE: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG DER IN DER WIENER VERTRAGSRECHT-
SKONVENTION VON 1969 GETROFFENEN REGELUNG 90, 170 (SCHRIFTEN ZUM VOL-
KERRECHT, Vol. 35, Berlin 1974).
57 Art. 31 Vienna Convention reads:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall com-
prise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provision;
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The key word of Article 2 (4) of the Charter is the term "force."
It is questionable if this covers only physical or armed force. A
vast number of publicists on international law understand it in this
narrow sense. Bowett writes:
* Taking the words in their plain, common-sense meaning, it is clear
that, since the prohibition is of the use or threat of force, they will
not apply to economic or political pressure, but only to physical,
armed force.58
Others, particularly authors from socialist countries, support a broad
reading of this provision. An analysis in the light of several mod-
ern English language dictionaries shows that both interpretations
of the term "force" are possible.5" The same is true when the French,
Spanish and Russian wording ("force," fuerza," "sila") of the
Charter are defined in their respective languages.
An examination of the term "force" in the context of Article
2(4) does not resolve the problem. Force is prohibited, if it is di-
rected against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state or if it is otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations. It is beyond doubt that the political independence
of a state can be eroded without the use of armed force. Just how
effective weapons of economic warfare can be has been demonstrated
in the first portion of this article detailing the facts of the Arab oil
embargo and the U.S. pressure against Chile. Turning to the pur-
poses of the United Nations, it is not obvious that only military
force is inconsistent with these objectives. Economic coercion may
occasionally constitute a threat to the peace. Further it is hard to
call this coercion a peaceful settlement of international disputes as
described in Articles 1(1) and 2(3) of the Charter. Further consid-
eration will be given to this question infra.
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the par-
ties so intended.
Art. 32 reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Art. 31, or to deter-
mine the meaning when the interpretation according to Art. 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;
or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
58 BOWETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1958).
59 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 773-74 (4th ed. 1968) and THE LITTLE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 202 (3d ed. 1968).
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A comparison with other parts of the Charter shows that in some
provisions the term "force" is used without additional explanations, 60
whereas in other articles the language "armed force" is to be found.6
This different terminology could lead to the conclusion that the
word "force" without the special addition "armed" has to be under-
stood in a broader sense. This conclusion is, however, unwarranted.
Article 44, for example, speaks of "force" only, though it deals with
"armed" force as can easily be seen by an examination of its con-
text.
As grammatical and systematic interpretation do not give an un-
ambiguous answer, it is useful to examine the object and purpose of
this provision and thereby attempt to interpret it teleologically. It
has already been mentioned that, in particular, developing countries
and members of the Eastern Bloc espouse a broad interpretation of
the prohibition on force.12  Their arguments are based on the
purposes and principles of the United Nations as formulated in Ar-
ticles I and 2 of the Charter: development of friendly relations, re-
spect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and achievement of international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic or social character. They
emphasize the economic interdependence between states in our mod-
ern world. Due to this fact economic coercion is most dangerous for
the independence of a state and could be even more effective than
armed force in reducing a country's power of self-determination,
especially if its economy depends primarily on a single crop or on
the export of a single product. Therefore, the highly developed
and industrialized nations are superior and can use their entire eco-
nomic potential to back up their own interests. Such neo-colonialist
practices, they maintain, are means of economic exploitation, re-
tarding or nullifying all efforts to overcome under-development,
and should therefore be denounced with utmost vigor.
These means of pressure may cause considerable harm for eco-
nomically weak countries lessening their freedom of self-determina-
tion.63  On the other hand, we have to give full consideration to
60 E.g., Art. 2(4) and 44 of the Charter.
61 E.g., Arts. 41, 46 and Preamble § 7 of the Charter.
62 For details, see BROSCHE, supra note 56, at 67-74, 183-86, and 190-92 with fur-
ther references.
63 In this respect it is interesting that the Soviet Union - one of the vehement de-
fenders of a wide concept concerning Art. 2(4) - did not hesitate to withdraw all de-
velopment aid from China, when the Ussuri conflict affected Chinese-Russian relations.
See Derpa, supra note 55, at 46 n.179.
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the fact that it is extremely difficult to draw a distinction between
economic and political means of coercion and measures of permitted
influence and persuasion. The latter are unavoidable in interstate
relations and may be attributed to a state's sovereignty and therefore
within the realm of permissible discretion.
On December 21, 1965 the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions adopted Resolution 2131 (XX),14 the "Declaration on the In-
admissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty." Paragraph 2 of
this resolution reads:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to ob-
tain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights,
or to secure from it advantages of any kind.
Considering this far-reaching formulation we have to keep in mind
that to a certain extent the exercise of influence on the politics and
economy of other states is desirable. Without this influence no nor-
mal economic and diplomatic relations between states are possible; a
minimum of influence and contact is essential and necessary for the
peaceful co-existence of nations and for the maintenance of peace.
Two recent examples illustrate this phenomenon. The United
States imposed strong pressure on the government of South Vietnam
in order to sign the armistice agreement drafted by the U.S. and
North Vietnam and in the most recent Middle-East conflict the
parties were forced to end the war under pressure from the two
superpowers. Further pressure is currently being used in attempts
to bring about a final peace treaty. Thus, economic and political
coercion play an important role in the regulation of international
conflicts, without being collective measures authorized by organs of
the United Nations. A prohibition of the threat or use of force in-
cluding any kind of political and economic pressure would conse-
quently be a mere illusion and utopian ideal. Even if Article 2(4)
of the Charter is not limited to armed force, a subtle distinction has
to be drawn vis-a-vis permitted exercises of influence and persuasion.
For further interpretation we may look at the nexus between
Article 2(4) and Articles 39 and 51 of the Charter. The Security
Council's monopoly over the use of force laid down in Articles 39
and 42 is one of the counterparts of the prohibition of the use of
S64Text: YEARBOOK U.N. 1965, at 94; the vote was 109 to none with the United
Kingdom abstaining. See Onuf, The Principle of Nonintervention, the United Nations,
and the International System, 25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 209 (1971).
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force in Article 2(4). Because of this close relationship it is argu-
able that the terms "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act
of aggression" in Article 39 constitute a disposition of the "force"
prohibited in Article 2(4).": Since the majority interprets Article
39 as excluding the use of economic and political pressure,66 it might
follow that Article 2(4) has to be read in a similarly narrow sense.
The right of self-defense formulated in Article 51, the other coun-
terpart of Article 2(4), is unanimously interpreted as applying only
to an armed attack. 7 As self-defense and prohibition of force cor-
respond with each other in the system of the Charter, the limitation
of Article 51 to an armed attack may suggest a narrow reading of
Article 2(4).
The arguments discussed thus far leave it uncertain whether po-
litical and economic coercion falls within the ambit of the general
prohibition of the use of force. This ambiguity may be resolved by
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation such as the pre-
paratory work of the Charter and the atmosphere surrounding its
conclusion. Among the materials submitted to the conference in
San Francisco in 1945 was an amendment promulgated by Brazil
which deserves consideration. According to this amendment Article
2 (4) should be worded:
All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force and from the threat or use
of economic measures in any manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Organization. 68
This amendment was rejected by a vote of 26 to 2.69 From this leg-
islative history it may be concluded that the delegates in San Fran-
cisco opposed the idea of a broadly construed Article 2 (4).'o Nev-
ertheless, the session reports do not support this conclusion: "The
Delegate of the United States made it clear that the intention of the
Authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an
65 See Wengler, supra note 54, at 23 n.3 1.
66 See VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHT 694 (5th ed. 1964).
67 GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 349
(3d ed. 1966); Dahm, Das Verbot der Gewaltanwendung nach Art. 2 (4) der Uno-
Charta und die Selbsthilfe gegeniiber V&kerrechtsverletzungen, die keinen bewaffneten
Angriff darstellen, 11 JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALEs RECHT 48, 52 (1962); Wild-
haber, Gewaltverbot und Selbstverteidigung, in Schaumann, V6LKERRECHTLICHES GE-
WALTVERBOT UND FRIEDENSSICHERUNG 147, 149 (1971), with further references.
686 U.N.C.I.O Docs. 559 (1945).
69 Id. at 334-39, 405, 609.
70 See Derpa, supra note 55, at 123, with further references.
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absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the phrase 'or in any other man-
ner' was designed to insure that there should be no loopholes. ' 71
According to these remarks the possibility that economic coer-
cion falls within the provisions of Article 2(4) is not absolutely
excluded."2 Even if the vote indicates a certain degree of hesita-
tion by the conference to give the prohibition of force a broad in-
terpretation, one has to bear in mind that the United Nations Char-
ter is no historical monument, but a living instrument which
continues to expand due to the dynamic and progressive nature of
our international society whose prime objectives is still the mainten-
ance of peace and security.
If we finally examine the practice of the United Nations, the
results reached are confirmed; early resolutions of the General As-
sembly indicate a narrow interpretation on the prohibition of the
use of force.7" More recent resolutions, on the other hand, deal ex-
pressly with economic and political pressure and emphatically con-
demn this kind of coercion. Resolution 2131 (XX) "Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention" has already been mentioned.
Other examples are Resolutions 1803 (XVIII) and 2160 (XXI).
The latter, "Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the Threat or
Use of Force," states:
Accordingly, armed attack by one State against another or the use
of force in any other form contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations constitutes a violation of international law giving rise to
international responsibility.
Even if these documents are not in themselves a source of interna-
tional law," and therefore do not impose direct obligations on states,
they may, nevertheless, initiate the development of general princi-
ples of customary law and are thus useful in interpreting general
clauses of the Charter in accordance with the corresponding will of
the majority of states.
Before reaching a final conclusion as to the ambit of Article 2 (4)
71 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 335, 405 (1945).
72See von Studnitz, Der erzwungene Vertrag im V6lkerrecht unter besonderer
Beriicksichtigung der Wiener Konvention iiber das Vertragsrecht 69 (Diss., Cologne
1972).
7 See, e.g., Res. 376 (V), 378 (V) and 380 (V).
74 Some modern writers consider that important U.N. Resolutions put direct obliga-
tions on states; thus they are likely to be a special source of international law and may
constitute some kind of international legislation. For details, see Golsong, Das Problem
der Recbtsetzung durch internationale Organisationen (insbesondere im Rabmen der
UN), in 10 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FUR VOLKERRECHT 1-50
(Karlsruhe 1971).
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of the Charter, it is useful to recall two other occasions where the
general prohibition of the threat or use of force played an impor-
tant role and where particular consideration was given to economic
and political pressure. These were the work of the Special Commit-
tee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States and the discussions of the Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties concerning Article 52 of the
"Treaty on Treaties" dealing with "Coercion of a State by the threat
or use of force."
The work of the Special Committee on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
Article 13(1) (a) of the Charter instructs the General Assembly
to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of
encouraging the progressive development of international law and
its codification. At first it was mainly the duty of the International
Law Commission to fulfill this task.7" In 1963 a new organ, the
Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, was created by
the General Assembly in Resolution 1966 (XVIII) to work on the
fundamental principles of peaceful co-existence among states.7 6 This
committee was composed of members from twenty-seven states.
Some of the principles the committee was instructed to consider
were:
(i) The principle that States shall refrain in their internation-
al relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
(ii) The principle that States shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security and justice are not endangered;
(iii) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter.
The committee held six sessions between 1964 and 1970 which re-
sulted in the formulation of the "Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
This declaration was approved without vote by the General Assem-
75 For the ILC's history, see BRIGGs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMIssION
(1965).
76 Onuf, supra note 64, at 213 elucidates the political background for this creation:
- because of the commission's conservative, 'legalistic' approach to its duties, neither
the International Law Commission nor the interested states desired to have the commis-
sion assigned this project."
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bly in its Resolution 2625 (XXV) at the commemorative session
of the United Nation's twenty-fifth anniversary.77
The principle concerning the threat or use of force was dis-
cussed widely during the committee's sessions. The delegates con-
sidered Article 2(4) of the Charter to be general international law,
binding not only on member states of the United Nations but on
non-members as well, on the basis of customary international law.
During the discussions emphasis was given to the question whether
the prohibition of the use of force refers to military actions only or
if the use of economic and political pressure inconsistent with the
Charter was also included. The arguments brought up in the commit-
tee were similar to those already mentioned when interpreting the
purpose of Article 2(4).78 Representatives of the developing coun-
tries alleged that the use of economic and political coercion is akin
to the use of armed force and likely to achieve similar results. As
military hostilities become more and more unlikely, developed coun-
tries use their economic capacity to obtain their political objectives,
and as a result force their will upon weaker states. The Western
Powers opposed this view very strongly and argued that politics and
economic measures are intermingled and cannot always be separated.
A certain degree of uncertainty would be introduced if any kind of
economic pressure were prohibited. The sovereignty of states would
generally be affected if states were allowed to denounce certain eco-
nomic measures of another state as "force." Nevertheless, delegates
of Western states admitted that a distinction should be drawn be-
tween economic pressure used for the purpose of affecting the po-
litical independence of other states and other kinds of pressure
which are a mere corollary of economic necessities, not being used to
obtain these "tainted" objectives.
Although careful and extensive examination was given to the
wording of Article 2(4), to its context and relation with other pro-
visions, to its legislative history and development since the entry into
force of the Charter, to its object and purpose as well as the current
requirements of the world community, no definite conclusion could
77 Text: 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121. For the work of the committee see Hou-
ben, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 703 (1967) and Rosenstock, The Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 713 (1971).
78 For a summary of the arguments, see DOHNA, DIE GRUNDPRINZIPEN DES VOL-
KERRECHTS UBER DIE FREUNDSCHAFTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN UND DIE ZUSAMMENAR-
BEIT ZWISCHEN DEN STAATEN 54-48 (SCHRIFTEN ZUM VOLKERRECHT, Vol. 30,
Berlin 1973).
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be reached. Therefore, the members of the committee in unofficial
consultations agreed to exclude this critical question from the prin-
ciple of the use or threat of force and leave it to the separate prin-
ciple of non-intervention. Concurrently it was made clear that
"that was not to say that all forms of economic and political pres-
sure which threatened the territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of another State were permissible: they might well constitute
illegal intervention."79
Due to these facts the term "force," as incorporated in the prin-
ciple that states shall refrain from the threat or use of force,8° is
open to future interpretation. 8'
The principle of non-intervention was as widely discussed as
the principle concerning the use or threat of force, especially after
the General Assembly in December 1965 adopted Resolution 2131
(XX), the "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Indepen-
dence and Sovereignty."
The delegates agreed on the point that the principle of non-
intervention was not expressis verbis laid down in the Charter. But
in considering from which of the Charter provisions it might be de-
duced, the disagreement became obvious. Questions of content and
ambit of the principle were the major reasons for this dispute. Rep-
resentatives of Western states cited Article 2(4), which limited the
extent of this principle. Socialist, Afro-Asian and Latin-American
delegates put emphasis on Article 1, Article 2(1) and particularly
on Article 2(7) of the Charter, in order to give the principle a
broad meaning. In relation to Article 2(7), which in prohibiting
intervention addresses itself to the United Nations only, it was ar-
gued that this provision assumes that in interstate relations, inter-
vention in domestic affairs is all the more forbidden than it would be
for the United Nations, which as an international organization is
responsible for maintaining peace without self-interest. The U.S.
delegate contested this view referring to the interpretation rule ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius;82 the fact that Article 2(7) men-
79 Mr. Sinclair of the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR. 25, at 12.
80 Paragraph 1 of the principle reads: "Every state has the duty to refrain in its inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of interna-
tional law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means
of settling international issues."
81 See DOHNA, supra note 78, at 57-58.
82 Schwebel, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 119/SR. 29, at 8 and SR. 30, at 23.
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tions the United Nations specifically, when broader terminology
could have been used, is indicative of the narrowness of this provi-
sion.
Another critical issue was the introduction of economic and po-
litical measures into the principle of non-intervention. With this,
Western delegates saw a restriction of political freedom of decision.
Nevertheless, they agreed to the interdiction of any kind of economic
and political interference. Thus, the final adoption of all principles
was not endangered.83
The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the
Charter, reads in sections 2 and 4:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to ob-
tain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no
State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subver-
sive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent
overthrow of a regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife
in another State.
Every State has the inalienable right to choose its political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any
form by another State.
It is of interest that the passage dealing with subversive measures
is already governed by Article 2(4) of the Charter insofar as armed
actions are concerned; in the context of non-intervention this lan-
guage also covers subversive measures of non-military character.
Section 4 in particular prohibits any interference or pressure for
changing the social or political order in another State. Both sec-
tions are of special relevance as far as Chile is concerned.
It is unclear whether this declaration represents a mere recom-
mendation or a statement of binding legal rules. Opinion between
members of the United Nations differs in this respect.84 Neither of
these two extremes can be proven correct, but the truth may come
closer to the latter.
The Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties
In 1968 and 1969 the Vienna Conference on the Law of Trea-
ties8 debated the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
83 DOHNA, supra note 78, at 126.
84 On this issue see Rosenstock, supra note 77, at 713-714, and Dohna, supra note
78, at 241-64.
85 Invoked by the General Assembly in its Resolutions 2166 (XXI) of Dec. 1966
and 2207 (XXII) of Dec. 1967.
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the Law of Treaties. This draft contained a provision concerning
the use or threat of force in the conclusion of treaties which was
finally adopted as Article 52 of the Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties.80  It reads:
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat
or use of force in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
The International Law Commission, when discussing whether the
term "force" embraced pressures of an economic or political nature,
was unable to arrive at any consensus on this point. Waldock, the
Special Rapporteur, therefore, recommended choosing a general
"open-ended" formulation:
[A]ny interpretation of the principle that States are under an obli-
gation to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of
the principles of the Charter, which becomes generally accepted
as authoritative, will automatically have its effects on the scope of
the rule laid down in the present article.' '87
The Commission, in its commentary on this provision, remarked:
Some members of the Commission expressed the view that any
other forms of pressure, such as a threat to strangle the economy of
a country, ought to be stated in the article as falling within the
concept of coercion. The Commission, however, decided to de-
fine coercion in terms of a "threat or use of force in violation of
the principles of the Charter," and considered that the precise scope
of the acts covered by this definition should be left to be deter-
mined in practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
Charter. 88
The Conference in Vienna did not favor this formulation. Nine-
teen states introduced an amendment to add the words "including
economic and political pressure" after "force. '"89
Major objections were raised by the Western states over this
86 On this provision, see Bothe, Consequences of the Prohibition of the Use of Force,
27 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 507
(1967); Bindschedler, V&lkerrechtliche Vertrdge und Zwang, 21 REVIsTA ESPAROLA
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 309 (1968); Stone, De Victoribus Victis: The ILC and
Imposed Treaties of Peace, 8 VA. INT'L L.J. 356 (1968); Murphy, Economic Duress and
Unequal Treaties, 11 VA. INT'L L.J. 51 (1970); and the monographs by V. Studnitz,
supra note 72, and BROSCHE, supra note 56.
87 YEARBOOK ILC 1966, Vol. 11, 19, 5 5.
88 Id. at 256, 5 3.
89 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/C. 1/L. 67/Rev. 1/Corr. 1; sponsors: Afghanistan, Al-
geria, Bolivia, Congo (Brazzaville), Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, Kenya, Ku-
wait, Mali, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Republic of
Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia. See U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Of-
fical Records, Documents of the Conference 172.
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amendment. If this language would be added, the scope of the pro-
vision would be so wide as to make it a serious danger to the stabil-
ity of treaty relations and to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.
Investors would regard the amendment as increasing their risks and
raising the cost of their respective investments. The amendment
was, therefore, likely to hurt those it was supposed to help."
Had it been pressed to a vote, the amendment would surely have
been adopted by a clear majority. But the opponents strenously in-
sisted on their position and made it clear that the "adoption of the
nineteen states amendment would seriously jeopardize the prospect
of producing a convention which would command the support of
many delegations."91  In order to save the work of the conference
the sponsors did not insist on putting their amendment to a vote.
Informal consultations were held to solve this conflict in hope of
reaching an agreement on a declaration to accompany Article 52 of
the Convention. This declaration was finally adopted by a vote of
102 to none with four abstentions and forms part of the Final Act
of the Conference.92 It reads:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Upholding the principle that every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed in good faith,
Reaffirming the principle of the sovereign equality of States,
Convinced that States must have complete freedom in performing
any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty,
Deploring the fact that in the past States have sometimes been
forced to conclude treaties under pressure exerted in various forms
by other States,
Desiring to ensure that in the future no such pressure will be ex-
erted in any form by any State in connexion with the conclusion
of a treaty,
1. Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form,
whether military, political, or economic, by any State in order to
coerce another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion
of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign equality
of States and freedom of consent,
2. Decides that the present Declaration shall form part of the
Final Act of the Conference on the Law of Treaties.
90 Kearney (USA), 51st meeting of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Conference
on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Official Records 292, 5 51.
91 Sinclair (United Kingdom), id. at 284, 5 37. See also Partridge, Political and
Economic Coercion: Within the Ambit of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties?, 5 INT'L LAwYER 755 (1971).
92 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/C. 1/L. 323, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Second Session, Official Records, 101, 5 13; text: Documents of the Conference, 173,
and 285.
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This declaration, 3 by influencing not only the development of
the future law of treaties, but also the evolving principles in other
areas of international law, should be instrumental in the movement
to outlaw economic and political pressure in inter-state relations.
Thus we have seen that the world is split on the question of
whether the general prohibition of the threat or use of force as
formulated in Article 2(4) of the Charter embraces pressures of an
economic or political nature. The Western view still confines Ar-
ticle 2(4) to armed force, excluding types of non-military coercion.
But current trends are clearly on the side of those who opt for a
broader interpretation. Particularly, Asian, African and Latin-
American countries are supporters of a broad view, as the debates in
the Special Committee concerning Friendly Relations and during
the Vienna Conference have shown. Their strong movement to out-
law economic and political pressure will bring about new norms
governing the limits of permissible economic coercion; new rules of
customary international law will emerge.
Turning back to the Arab oil embarge and the pressure exer-
cised by the United States against Chile, it is perhaps too early to
say that these measures were definitely prohibited by Article 2 (4) of
the Charter. It is amazing that the embargo was imposed by coun-
tries which have the strongest voice when the prohibition of eco-
nomic and political pressure is in question. This fact places some
doubt on their credibility. In the case of Chile it may be said that
even if Article 2(4) of the Charter was not violated, the principle
of non-intervention was, nevertheless, affected.
The Principle of pacific settlement of disputes in Article 2(3) and
Chapter VI of the Charter
Considering related provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
tions which might be of relevance in this matter, we have to take
into account that the obligation of Article 2(4) is completed by sec-
tion 3 of the same article which provides that:
[A]Il members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
This refers to Chapter VI of the Charter on "Pacific Settlements of
Disputes," particularly Article 33. "Peaceful settlement" is a logi-
o9 In addition a resolution was adopted in order to bring this declaration to the atten-
tion of all states and give it the widest possible publicity and dissemination.
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cal corollary of the principle that states shall refrain from the threat
or use of force set forth in Article 2 (4).
Maintenance of international peace and security through peace-
ful settlement is one of the primary purposes of the United Nations. 4
For this reason the Charter imposes upon members the obligation to
settle their international disputes by peaceful means. But the prin-
ciple as stated in Article 2(3) assumes that a "dispute" exists; simi-
larly the title of Chapter VII refers to disputes; Articles 34, 35 and
36 use the somewhat broader language "or any situation which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute .... ." A dis-
pute has been defined as a "disagreement on a point of law or fact,
a conflict of legal views of interest between two persons. '' 5 It has
also been characterized by Fawcett, in the "Sub-Committee on Inter-
national Co-operation in the Political Field," as:9"
a disagreement; in other words, there must be a controversy be-
tween the parties. This takes the form of claims, which are met
with refusals, counter-claims, denials or countercharges, accusations
etc.
This definition certainly applies to the situation in the Middle East.
The Arab states objected to the United States' policy towards Israel
during the Yom Kippur War and imposed the embargo in an at-
tempt to modify this pro-Israel policy. The situation in Chile was
quite different. The mere fact that the Allende government fol-
lowed a socialist policy did not constitute a dispute of an interna-
tional character. It would be absurd to allow one state, seeking to
change the political and economic situation of another state, to de-
clare its political intention to be an international dispute, thus, forc-
ing the other state to settle the controversy through negotiations.
Such an interpretation would be contrary to the principle of non-
intervention which protects this area of domestic jurisdiction from
any interference. The nationalization of the copper mines, on the
other hand, affected American interests, and in this respect the exis-
tence of a dispute certainly cannot be denied. This dispute was not
of a mere private nature. The excess-profits doctrine made it a mat-
ter of international concern, as the general standards of compensa-
tion were affected.
Article 33 of the Charter explains the general obligation stated
in Article 2(3) in greater detail. It refers to disputes, "the con-
94 See Art. 1(1) of the Charter.
95 PCIJ (Mavrommatis-Case) Set. A/No. 2, p. 11.
96 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/1388 (1950).
1974]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security" and enumerates various procedures for
their settlement: i.e.,
Negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
Even if this list is not considered to be exhaustive, it is quite clear
that embargoes, boycotts, blockades, reprisals, or other kinds of eco-
nomic and political pressure do not constitute procedures of pacific
settlement. They are not peaceful means and not appropriate for
the solution of disputes. The use or imposition of such measures
would constitute a violation of the obligation to settle international
disputes by peaceful means.
The principle of Article 2(3) was one of those which the Spe-
cial Committee on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States took into consid-
eration for the progressive development and codification of interna-
tional law. In the committee's declaration as approved in Resolu-
tion 2625 (XXV) by the General Assembly, this principle is fur-
ther interpreted in the following language:
States parties to an international dispute, as well as other States,
shall refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation
so as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity, and shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations. International disputes shall be settled on
the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance
with the principle of free choice of means. Recourse to, or ac-
ceptance of, a settlement procedure freely agreed to by States with
regard to existing or future disputes to which they are parties shall
not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign equalityY7
The clause prohibiting any action which may aggravate a dispute
shows clearly which measures are not considered to be peaceful.
Further, the passage dealing with sovereign equality reads in its
original draft: "International disputes shall be settled on the basis
of the sovereign equality of States, in the spirit of understanding and
without the use of any form of pressure." '  Due to these facts it
becomes evident that the use of any kind of pressure is contrary to
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.
07 Sections 4 and 5 of this principle.
98 See DOHNA, supra note 78, at 151.
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CONCLUSION AND OPINION
This examination of whether economic and political pressure
may be used in international relations was limited to possible vio-
lations of the Charter of the United Nations. In concentrating on
this document other material dealing with these questions has been
left aside. Without becoming a thorough examination, brief men-
tion should, nevertheless, be made of this other material, to correlate
it to the analysis of the Charter, supra.
Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of Amer-
ican States state:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external af-
fairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only
armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted
threat against the personality of a State or against its political, eco-
nomic and cultural elements.
No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will
of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
It is questionable whether these provisions are of any relevance out-
side the Western hemisphere. 9 But they obviously deserve further
consideration in the relations between Chile and the United States,
as both countries are members of the OAS and, therefore, bound by
the provisions of its Charter.
Turning to the GATT which was mentioned in Professor Gard-
ner's speech, one finds specific rules of economic conduct."° ° These
provisions even provide a form of dispute settlement for illegal eco-
nomic coercion.
Several conferences and meetings were concerned with pressures
of an economic and political nature. The Afro-Asian Conference at
Bandung (1955) gave in its Final Communiqu6 approval to a renun-
ciation of any kind of pressure.' The Conferences of Heads of
State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, held 1961 in Bel-
grade and 1964 in Cairo, and the tripartite meeting of 1966 in New
Delhi between President Tito, President Nasser and Prime Minister
Indira Ghandi, singled out economic and political pressure as a form
of force exercised by certain powers over developing countries and
9" See Derpa, supra no:e 55, at 133; and THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (1972).
100 On this issue, see Bowett, supra note 50, at 4-5.
101 Principle 6(b); see Sasse, Die asiatischafrikanischen Staaten auf der Bandung-
Konferenz, Dokumente vol. 27 (Frankfurt/Berlin 1958), p. 75.
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further condemned the use of economic and financial aid as an in-
strument of pressure.' These denunciations cannot in themselves
establish international rules because they still lack universal assent,
but they will contribute to the development of customary interna-
tional law.
In light of the foregoing examination, the use of economic and
political coercion in international relations, as it occurred during the
Arab oil embargo and before Allende's overthrow in Chile, is in-
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The general
prohibition of the threat or use of force as formulated in Article
2(4) is, from the Western viewpoint, still confined to military and
armed force. But as the evidence presented in previous sections
indicates, current trends are clearly towards a broader interpretation
of this principle. To disregard these events is to ignore the change
that is taking place in contemporary international law. Furthermore,
it may be argued that, in certain cases, measures of an economic and
political character which equal armed force in their results fall with-
in the ambit of Article 2(4). It is difficult to tell whether the oil
embargo and the Chilean situation constitute measures of this kind.
They are certainly on the borderline and contrary to the spirit of the
Charter. The Chilean case may even be contrary to the principle of
non-intervention.
As far as Article 2(3) and Chapter VI of the Charter are con-
cerned, it is beyond doubt that any kind of pressure is contrary to
the principle of pacific settlement of disputes. The obligations
imposed by these provisions were consequently violated in both cases.
It is evident that states have become more interdependent in
economic relations despite failure to develop and agree upon fun-
damental principles of economic justice. To a certain extent eco-
nomic warfare is still accepted by many countries as a means of
regulating interstate relations and obtaining political goals. The
differences in strength of economic power between rich and poor
countries make it easy to use this weapon. In addition, even though
the developing states, many of which are newly independent, seem
to be the staunchest advocates of the outlawing of economic and
political pressure, they sometimes find themselves having recourse
to these kinds of coercion. Therefore, we are still far from a total
denunciation of economic warfare.
Lastly, it might be suggested that organs of the United Nations
102 For further examples, see GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, supra note 67, at 42,
n.62.
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become more involved in settlements of disputes such as those dis-
cussed. Article 11 of the Charter specifically authorizes the General
Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on questions re-
lated to the maintenance of international peace and security when-
ever the Security Council is unable to discharge its primary respon-
sibility. Article 14 makes it clear that the General Assembly may
also recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of other types
of situations which might impair the general welfare or friendly re-
lations among nations. Article 34 finally gives the Security Council
authority to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. The signifi-
cance of these articles cannot be overstressed. They constitute the
basis for pacific settlements of disputes through United Nations' or-
gans and in addition, can be invoked for the denunciation of eco-
nomic and political pressure in international relations.
